Inconsistency in two approaches to German affricates. Part 1: The Basic Inconsistency of German Affricates in Wurzel's approach

Linguistics lacks clear methodological guidelines which could be made use of whenever one faces a contradiction. The basic inconsistency of German affricates provides an instructive example of the problems emerging from this situation. This paper aims to reveal why Wurzel's eclectic framework, applying both notions of structuralist phonology and SPE, yields an irresolvable inconsistency. CV phonology raised the hope that the latter could be void of the shortcomings characterising earlier approaches. The continuation of this paper, Rákosi (2014) will be devoted to the analysis of Prinz & Wiese's (1991) approach

Inconsistency in two approaches to German affricates. Part 2: The Basic Inconsistency of German Affricates in Prinz & Wiese’s approach

Irresolvable inconsistencies can often be solved within a new theoretical framework. CV phonology raised the hope that it could be void of the shortcomings characterising earlier approaches to the basic inconsistency of German affricates. Although Prinz & Wiese's (1991) approach is clearly better from several points of view than Wurzel’s eclectic framework, the basic inconsistency of German affricates did not become solvable within this framework, either. The reason for this is, above all, that the conflicting test results could not be separated from each other satisfactorily, in a well-founded manner

The fabulous engine: strengths and flaws of psycholinguistic experiments

In methodological debates in linguistics, the scientificness of linguistics is often felt to be unsatisfactory in comparison to the standards of the natural sciences. This inferiority complex is in most cases articulated as the requirement to turn linguistics into a mature empirical theory with the help of, for example, the elaboration and conduct of psycholinguistic experiments. This paper argues that the proposals which have been put forward to fulfill this requirement are based not on workable and generally applied norms of the natural sciences but on outmoded and untenable tenets of the standard view of the analytical philosophy of science. Therefore, a two-step strategy is suggested: metascientific reflection on the nature and limits of experiments as data sources in linguistics has to be based on the continuous comprehension and adjustment of the reflection on the research activities of linguists while working with experiments on the one hand, and insights gained by philosophers of science studying experiments in the natural sciences on the other. The feasibility of this strategy is supported by a case study on psycholinguistic experiments in metaphor research

On the rhetoricity of psycholinguistic experiments

Experiments have to be objective and intersubjectively controllable, and the experimental report must not make use of rhetorical tools that aim merely at persuading the reader but it has to allow the reader a direct access to the experimental evidence. At the same time, however, the reliability of psycholinguistic experiments does not seem to stem from an impersonal and straightforward linkage between “empirical facts” and hypotheses. Rather, it depends crucially on the peculiarities and the plausibility of the argumentation put forward in the experimental report, on its persuasiveness and its convincing force. The present paper aims at resolving this problem that I call the rhetorical paradox of psycholinguistic experiments

Remarks on the cognitive base of pragmatic principles

The present paper aims at the exemplification of the applicability of plausibility analysis to linguistics. Starting from the criticism of Robinson (1997), the paper argues for two assumptions. Firstly, as opposed to a theory of distributed systems, it is a theory of plausible reasoning that is capable of capturing basic methodological problems of theory formation in pragmatics (such as circularity, category error, the arbitrariness of interpretations of data and the objectification of the theorist's cultural and linguistic knowledge as principles of language behaviour). Secondly, the cognitive base of pragmatic principles is inferential and plausibilistic, rather than non-inferential and probabilistic

Paraconsistency and Plausible Argumentation in Generative Grammar: A Case Study

While the analytical philosophy of science regards inconsistent theories as disastrous, Chomsky allows for the temporary tolerance of inconsistency between the hypotheses and the data. However, in linguistics there seem to be several types of inconsistency. The present paper aims at the development of a novel metatheoretical framework which provides tools for the representation and evaluation of inconsistencies in linguistic theories. The metatheoretical model relies on a system of paraconsistent logic and distinguishes between strong and weak inconsistency. Strong inconsistency is destructive in that it leads to logical chaos. In contrast, weak inconsistency may be constructive, because it is capable of accounting for the simultaneous presence of seemingly incompatible structures. However, paraconsistent logic cannot grasp the dynamism of the emergence and resolution of weak inconsistencies. Therefore, the metatheoretical approach is extended to plausible argumentation. The workability of this metatheoretical model is tested with the help of a detailed case study on an analysis of discontinuous constituents in Government-Binding Theory. Keywords: generative syntax, inconsistency, paraconsistency, plausible argumentatio

Die Behandlung von Inkonsistenz in der Optimalitätstheorie

This paper analyses the treatment of inconsistencies in Optimality Theory by making use of the tools of the p-model of plausible argumentation by Kertész & Rákosi (2012). With the help of a case study it reconstructs and evaluates the most frequent methods applied by OT. It shows that these strategies are based on the reconstruction of inconsistencies as “weak” inconsistency and can be interpreted as the joint application of the “contrastive” and “combinative” strategies of the treatment of inconsistencies. Since the p-model interprets linguistic theorising as a problem solving process, it is capable of describing the characteristic of OT that it subscribes a constitutive role to the continuous emergence and resolution of inconsistencies. Therefore, it is possible to compare the techniques applied by OT to the handling of inconsistencies by Government and Binding Theory

Az adattípusok integrációjának tudománymódszertani problémái az elméleti nyelvészetben

Az elméleti nyelvészetben jelenleg éles vita folyik arról, hogy milyen adattípusok és milyen adatforrások fogadhatók el. A vita kiváltója az elméleti nyelvészet fő áramában évtizedek óta domináns szerepet játszó, az introspekcióban mint adatforrásban gyökerező grammatikalitási ítéletek megbízhatóságába vetett bizalom megrendülése. A jelen tanulmány amellett érvel, hogy bármily problematikusak is az introspektív adatok, nem iktathatók ki az elméleti nyelvészetből. Ezért az alapkérdés nem az, hogy milyen adattípussal válthatók fel, hanem az, hogy milyen módon integrálhatók egymással különböző adatforrásokból származó adattípusok az elméleti nyelvészetben. Ugyanakkor a jelenlegi elméleti nyelvészet tudománymódszertana alkalmatlan arra, hogy e kérdésre elfogadható, a nyelvészeti kutatómunka gyakorlatában alkalmazható választ adjon. A tanulmány központi feltevése az, hogy Kertész – Rákosi (2012) p-modellje lehet egy olyan újfajta tudománymódszertan egyik lehetséges (de nem az egyedül lehetséges) kiindulópontja, amely a különböző adatforrásokból származó, különböző adattípusok integrációjának igényét a jelenleginél hatékonyabban ki tudja szolgálni